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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AND THE
FEDERAL ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972)
A county prosecutor brought suit in a state court to close petitioner's
bookstore as a public nuisance.' A preliminary order preventing op-
eration of the store was granted. While his appeal was pending in the
state courts, petitioner filed an action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in
federal district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
the state court proceedings on the ground that the state statute was be-
ing unconstitutionally applied to him, causing great and irreparable in-
jury. A three-judge court2 refused to enjoin the state proceedings,
holding that it was without power to grant such relief in a section 1983
case due to the federal anti-injunction statute.3 The Supreme Court
reversed, held: section 1983 constitutes an express exception to the
anti-injunctibn statute. 4
Traditionally, to secure an injunction under section 1983 against a
state court, a plaintiff had to overcome three obstacles: the abstention
1. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.05 (1962):
Whoever shall erect, establish, continue or maintain, own or lease any build-
ing, booth, tent or place which tends to annoy the community or injure the
health of the community, or become manifestly injurious to the morals or
manners of the people ... or any house or place of prostitution, assignation,
lewdness or place or building where games of chance are engaged in violation
of law or any place where any law of the state is violated, shall be deemed
guilty of maintaining a nuisance, and the building, erection, place, tent or
booth and the furniture, fixtures and contents are declared a nuisance. All
such persons or places shall be abated or enjoined ....
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 60.05(1) & (2) (1962):
(1) When any nuisance as defined in § 823.05, exists, the state attorney,
county solicitor, county prosecutor, or any citizen of the county may sue in
the name of the state on his relation to enjoin the nuisance, the person or
persons maintaining it and the owner or agent of the building or ground on
which the nuisance exists.
(2) The court may allow a temporary injunction without bond on proper
proof being made.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1970) requires that a three-judge court be convened when-
ever an injunction is sought to restrain a state officer from enforcing or executing an
allegedly unconstitutional state statute.
3. Mitchum v. Foster, 315 F. Supp. 1387 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
4. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972).
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doctrines; 5 the federal anti-injunction statute; and requirements of
equity. The first hurdle applies to all cases coming before the federal
courts, and involves the refusal by a court to proceed though it admit-
tedly has jurisdiction.' The second two obstacles are of concern here.
Some form of anti-injunction statute directed against federal court in-
terference in state court proceedings has existed since the inception of
the federal system.7 While the precise reasons for the passage of the
original act are unclear, it is generally accepted that among the most
important contributing factors were strong notions of federal-state com-
ity and a general hostility toward equity jurisdiction." Given this basis,
the original statute was worded as an absolute prohibition against the
issuance of federal injunctions to stay state court proceedings. 9 Over
the years, however, certain statutory exceptions to the anti-injunction
statute were enacted, 10 and a few judicially created exceptions were
recognized." The present wording of the statute'12 was adopted by
5. There are four separate abstention doctrines, based on different factual sit-
uations and having different procedural consequences, but to some extent overlapping:
(1) avoid deciding a federal constitutional question if it is possible to dispose of the
issue on adequate state grounds; (2) avoid needless conflict with a state's administra-
tion of its own affairs; (3) leave to state courts unresolved questions of state law; and
(4) ease congestion in court dockets. C. W1uOsT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
CouRTs § 52 (2d ed. 1970).
6. For an explanation of the rationale underlying the abstention doctrine, see
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Landry v.
Daley, 288 F. Supp. 200, 209-12 (N.D. I1. 1968).
7. The original statute was enacted in 1793.
8. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 130-31 (1941). For a
thorough discussion of the early history of this statute, see la J. MooRE, FEDERAL
PRACTicE 0.208 [1) & [2] (1965); Warren, Federal and State Court Interferences,
43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 347-49 (1930).
9. Act of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335: "[Nor shall a writ of
injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court of a state."
10. Prior to 1941, the courts recognized five statutory exceptions: The Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 29(a) (1970); Statutory Interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1970);
Removal Statutes, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1450 (1970); Frazier-Lemke Farm Mortgage Act,
11 U.S.C. § 203(s)(2) (1970); and the Shipowners' Liability Act, 46 U.S.C. § 185
(1970).
Of these exceptions, only the Bankruptcy Act was specifically referred to in the
anti-injunction statute. The others were recognized as exceptions because of statu-
tory language referring either to state courts specifically (Interpleader and Removal
Acts), or to courts in general (Shipowners' Liability and Frazier-Lemke Acts).
11. There were two judicially created exceptions prior to 1941. (1) In cases in
which either a state or federal court first obtained jurisdiction over the res involved
in an in rem action, the other court was precluded from proceeding against the same
res. See, e.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226 (1922). (2) An injunction
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Congress to legislatively acknowledge these "exceptions" to the anti-
injunction statute.13
Following a strict approach in interpreting the statute, 4 the Supreme
Court recently held that further exceptions are not to be created by the
courts. 5 Rather, an injunction will be issued against state court pro-
ceedings only if it falls within one of the three exceptions listed in the
statute.'0 In most cases, the injunction will have to be "expressly au-
thorized by Act of Congress.' 7 What constitutes an express exception
would issue to prevent relitigation in a state court of issues already decided in a fed-
eral court. See, e.g., Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921);
Looney v. Eastern Texas Ry., 247 U.S. 214 (1918).
12. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary
in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283
(1970).
13. The Supreme Court rejected these exceptions and took a strict "hands-off"'
approach in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941), in which it
struck down the relitigation exception. The Court did accept the in rem exception
because the rationale behind that exception, the avoidance of federal-state conflict, is
the same as the purpose of the anti-injunction statute. The five statutory exceptions
were also accepted on the grounds that they constituted, by their terms, express author-
ization by Congress.
The Reviser's Note, printed following 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), states that the
revision was specifically designed to "restore the basic law as generally understood and
interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." The "in aid of its jurisdiction exception"
was meant to apply to removal cases (cases removed to federal court) and the "protect
or effectuate its judgments" language to the relitigation cases. The "expressly au-
thorized" exception was a general substitution for the previous bankruptcy exception
and apparently comprehended the five statutory exceptions recognized prior to Toucey.
14. The first decision in which the Supreme Court applied § 2283 as currently
worded indicated that its "hands-off' approach in Toucey had not been altered by
the new wording. The Court emphasized that § 2283 was not merely an expression
of comity but a clear congressional prohibition, and ". . . Congress made clear beyond
cavil that the prohibition is not meant to be whittled away by judicial improvisation
. .Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 514
(1955). But this stand acquired an apparent ambiguity two years later when the Court
held that the prohibitions of § 2283 were inapplicable to stays sought by the federal
government, relying on the reasoning that to hold otherwise would result in "frustra-
tion of superior federal interests." Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S.
220, 226 (1957).
15. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281
(1970).
16. The Court held that federal courts could not ignore § 2283 and enjoin state
court proceedings "merely because those proceedings interfere with a protected federal
right or invade an area pre-empted by federal law, even when the interference is un-
mistakably clear." Id. at 294.
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970).
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within the meaning of the statute thus becomes crucial, but that ques-
tion has proven difficult to answer.' 8 Looking to the common thread
running through the previously recognized exceptions, the Court in
Mitchum formulated a test to resolve this issue, determining that an
express exception would exist ". . . wherever an Act of Congress,
clearly creating a federal right or remedy enforceable in a federal court
of equity could be given its intended scope only by the stay of a state
court proceeding."'19 Because section 1983 met these criteria, the
Court in Mitchum found it to be an express exception within the mean-
ing of the anti-injunction statute.
Section 198320 was a product of the Reconstruction era and was
passed because many citizens were being deprived of federally guaran-
teed rights, either by the terms of state laws or by the inadequacy or
unavailability of redress in state courts.2 1  Early cases construing sec-
tion 1983 established that the state judiciary enjoyed no immunity from
the Act's provisions2  and that the eleventh amendment23 presented no
serious limitation on equitable relief.2 4  Injunctions requested under
18. Instead of focusing on what is necessary to constitute an express exception,
courts and commentators have generally spoken in terms of what factors were not
necessary, i.e. the act need not refer specifically to the anti-injunction statute nor
need it expressly allow a stay of a state court proceeding. See, e.g., Amalgamated
Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros. Co., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955); Dilworth v. Riner,
343 F.2d 226, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1965). See also C. WIGrT, supra note 5, at § 47;
Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Proceedings, 74 HInv. L. REV. 726 (1961).
19. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 238 (1972).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970):
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Consti-
tution and Laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
21. For a discussion of the history and purposes of § 1983, see Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
22. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), held a state judge subject to crimi-
nal conviction under the Civil Rights Act. See also C. ANTlEAU, FEDERAL. CIvi.
RIGHTS AcTs: CivIn PRACTICE §§ 39-40 (1971).
23. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
24. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908), it was determined that a fed-
eral court could enjoin a state attorney general from enforcing a statute which im-
posed criminal sanctions upon railroad employees who violated a state law setting
allegedly unconstitutional railroad rates as an illegal act by the official in an individual
capacity.
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section 1983 were granted in accordance with the general requirements
of equity,2" and those requirements were defined with reference to
principles of comity."' In Younger v. Harris,2 7 the Supreme Court,
relying heavily on the principle of comity, held that the equitable re-
quirements could be met in a section 1983 suit to enjoin a state crim-
inal proceeding only on a showing of bad faith or other "extraordinary
circumstances. '2 8
25. The two most fundamental requirements of equity, that there be no adequate
remedy at law, and that one will suffer irreparable injury if the requested relief is not
granted, have always been prerequisites to federal injunctive relief against state action.
See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Beal v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Spielman Motor Sales
Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
When the state proceeding sought to be enjoined is a criminal one, the equitable re-
quirements have been traditionally more strict:
It is very commonly stated by courts that equity has no jurisdiction to enjoin
prosecutions under statutes or ordinances creating criminal offenses. One of
the reasons for the rule is that the enforcement of the criminal law is a mat-
ter beyond the jurisdiction of a court of equity.
H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQurry § 173 (2d ed. 1948).
"[F]ederal interference with a State's good faith administration of its criminal laws
is peculiarly inconsistent with our federal framework . .. ." Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951); Douglas v.
City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Cf.
Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950).
26. In Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), the Court held that the
irreparable injury must be both great and immediate, and present some dangers other
than those incident to any criminal prosecution brought in good faith. The Court
stated:
[Clourts of equity in the exercise of their discretionary powers should con-
form to this policy [of non-interference] by refusing to interfere with or em-
barrass threatened proceedings in state courts save in those exceptional cases
which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irreparable
injury which is clear and imminent; and equitable remedies infringing this
independence of the states-though they might otherwise be given-should be
withheld if sought on slight or inconsequential grounds.
Id. at 163.
27. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
28. The Court determined that mere allegations that a statute was invalid on its
face are insufficient to meet the requirements of equity. As an example of what "ex-
traordinary circumstances" might merit relief, the Court suggested a situation involving
a statute flagrantly and patently violative of Constitutional rights. Id. at 53-54.
The Younger case cleared away the doubts remaining as to equitable requirements in
§ 1983 suits. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), the Court had ap-
peared to relax those standards by holding that an injunction would issue where it was
alleged that a facially invalid state statute was being enforced in bad faith as part of a
plan of harassment. The decision was widely interpreted to mean that an injunction
would lie if either of these allegations were present. See Sedler, The Dombrowski-Type
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For years, whenever an injunction against state court proceedings
was sought, the Supreme Court deftly avoided deciding whether section
1983 constituted an express exception to the anti-injunction statute.
It accomplished this either by finding that there was no proceeding
within the meaning of section 1983,29 or by holding that the equitable
criteria of section 1983 were not met.30 Absent guidance from the Su-
preme Court, lower federal courts were split on the question of whether
section 1983 constituted an express exception to the anti-injunction
statute, section 2283. 11
Because the Court had already decided that section 2283 was to be
strictly construed, 2 and because it had already delineated the equities
involved in granting an injunction against a state court in a criminal
case,33 the Supreme Court was virtually forced in Mitchum to decide
Suit as an Effective Weapon for Social Change: Reflections from Without and Within,
18 KAN. L. REv. 237 (1970). However, the Younger decision was not totally unex-
pected, because in Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968), the Court did not accept
petitioners' allegation of selective enforcement, but rather made an independent ex-
amination of the record and concluded that no irreparable injury was shown.
29. "A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings
in a state court . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970) (emphasis added). The Court
avoided the question in Dombrowski because the grand jury had not yet returned in-
dictments against petitioners at the time the federal suit was filed. Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), also in-
volved threatened prosecutions. This distinction between pending and threatened
prosecutions has been heavily criticized as predicating relief on a race to the courthouse.
See, e.g., Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1040 (1970); Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1871 Versus the Anti-Injunction Statute:
The Need for a Federal Forum, 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 625.
Two recent cases indicate that the definition of what constitutes a "proceeding" may
continue to be determinative of the applicability of § 2283 to § 1983 suits. Roude-
bush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972) (Indiana provision for recount of election bal-
lots held not a proceeding); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972) (Con-
necticut garnishment action held not a proceeding).
30. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S.
82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S.
611 (1968).
31. Is not an express exception: Baines v. City of Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th
Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1965); Goss v. Illinois, 312 F.2d 259 (7th Cir.
1963); Smith v. Village of Lansing, 241 F.2d 856 (7th Cir. 1957).
Is an express exception: Honey v. Goodman, 432 F.2d 333 (6th Cir. 1970);
Machesky v. Bizzell, 414 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969); Sheridan v. Garrison, 415 F.2d 699
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970); Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d
119 (3d Cir. 1950).
32. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 398 U.S. 281
(1970). See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
33. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See note 28 supra and accompany-
ing text.
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that section 1983 does constitute an express exception to section 2283.84
If the Court had held otherwise, it would have seriously crippled the
effectiveness of the Civil Rights Act, for then an injunction could not
issue, no matter how extraordinary the circumstances.35 The impact
of the Court's decision that section 1983 constitutes an express excep-
tion to the anti-injunction statute is tempered, however, by the recogni-
tion that the Court was deciding only that federal courts are not without
power to issue injunctions against state court proceedings pursuant to
section 1983.36 The principles of comity, equity, and federalism are
still applicable to requests for such relief.3 7
In its prior attempts to avoid the "express exception" issue, the
Court created a substantial body of law concerning the remaining re-
quirements, which are to be considered independently. Abstention
will be appropriate except in cases involving a statute invalid on its face
that chills free expression. 38 Furthermore, strong notions against fed-
eral interference in state criminal proceedings will continue to be a fac-
tor.39 The strictness of the equitable requirements adopted by the
Court 0 indicates that irreparable injury can only be shown through
bad faith or other extraordinary circumstances that would preclude ade-
34. See, e.g., Note, The Federal Anti-Injunction Statute in Pending State Criminal
Prosecutions, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 107, 118 (1971); Comment, 46 Noma DAME
Lkw. 616, 629 (1971).
35. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 231 (1972). The opinion relies heavily on
the difficulty of attempting to reconcile a statute that was the product of the Federalist
era (§ 2283) with one that resulted from the tremendous reallocation of federal-
state power that grew out of the Civil War (§ 1983). This theory was the basis for
Justice Douglas's vigorous dissent in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 61-62 (1971).
36. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 243 (1972).
37. See notes 5-6, 25-28 supra and accompanying text.
38. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967). Wright contends there are several
principles of abstention: (1) the court should render a declaratory judgment if the
statute is clearly valid or invalid on its face; (2) the court should abstain if the am-
biguities in the statute can be clarified in a single prosecution; (3) abstention is not
appropriate where the statute is not clear on its face, and free expression will be in-
hibited while a series of decisions clarifies the ambiguities. C. WRiGHT, supra note 5,
at 207-08. See Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. This may be even more heavily relied upon after Mitchum in order to prevent
constant disruption of state administration of justice if every alleged denial of pro-
cedural due process is subject to a federal injunction. See cases cited in note 24 supra.
See also Cooper v. Hutchinson, 184 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1950); Mayberry v. Weinrott,
255 F. Supp. 80 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Court Pro-
ceedings, 74 HAv. L. REv. 726, 728 (1961).
40. See notes 25-28 supra.
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quate vindication of rights through the usual channels.41
In light of the strength of these considerations, and since very few
injunctions have been denied solely on the ground that section 2283
bars the relief sought,42 it is difficult to conclude that Mitchum will
drastically alter the law in this area. While Mitchum may result in an
increase in the use of section 1983 to halt harassment, mere allegations
in the complaint will not be sufficient.43 Decisions whether to grant
or deny equitable relief will still depend largely on judicial application
of discretionary doctrines, thus circumscribing the scope of judicial re-
view. As a result, Mitchum may simply prevent summary treatment of
section 1983 suits by requiring courts to consider requests for injunc-
tive relief in light of the purposes behind section 1983, without violat-
ing policy considerations deemed essential to the smooth functioning of
the federal system.
41. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
42. See Cole v. Graybeal, 313 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Va. 1970); Nichols v. Vance,
293 F. Supp. 680 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 873
(S.D. Miss. 1966).
43. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968). See note 28 supra.
Vol. 1972:782] 789
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss4/8
